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Taking a Joke Seriously: Mickey 
Mouse and William Kentridge1
❦
Nienke Boer
Transformation, metamorphosis is of course 
the bread and butter of animation in the 
studio. Something difficult to do… on the 
stage, to turn a cat into a telephone, gets 
called together by the cloth, the paper, the 
charcoal, the eraser. 
—William Kentridge, “Drawing  
Lesson 5: In Praise of Mistranslation.”
The film opens in what appears to be the control room of a large 
organization: computers line the left wall, and, on a large clock, mov-
ing hands illustrate the passage of time. The scene shifts abruptly 
to a man in a pinstriped business suit, standing in what seems to 
be a bedroom (wood flooring, a fireplace, a small rug and the end 
of a single bed), reading a letter, which moves slightly as he holds 
it. Then, the third scene: a difficult-to-identify structure next to the 
side of a road—gleaming tracks on the road suggest that it could 
be a tram station, but the position of the windows also hint at the 
security booth of a gated community or large business. A bird flies 
over from the top left corner of the screen, leaving a smudged trail 
behind it, and the scene changes again, to a close-up of the top of 
1My sincere thanks to Mark Sanders for his comments on earlier versions of this 
article, which originated in the context of a graduate seminar he taught at New York 
University in Spring 2010: “Word, Image, Sound: William Kentridge and Literature.”
1147M L N
a power line, where a bird (the same one?) appears at the top left 
corner and flies across the screen, still trailing black smudges. Finally, 
the scene shifts again and a black cat walks across the screen from left 
to right. As the cat walks along a white wall, letters spelling out the 
word “Stereoscope” appear one by one on the wall behind it. This is 
the “cold open” of William Kentridge’s eighth Drawing for Projection, 
Stereoscope (1999). All of this is drawn in charcoal and animated by a 
kind of stop-motion animation, where small changes are made to a 
base drawing in between sequential shots of it. Thus “each sequence 
as opposed to each frame of the film is a single drawing” (Kentridge, 
“‘Fortuna’” 64). The charcoal leaves smudged traces behind when it 
is erased, resulting in, for example, the trail behind the bird as it flies 
across the sky. Kentridge uses this technique, which he calls “stone 
age film-making” (“‘Fortuna’” 61), to produce a drawn and animated 
world peopled by three main characters—the man in the pinstripe 
suit, Soho Eckstein, his wife, Mrs. Eckstein, and Felix Teitlebaum, an 
artist who pursues Mrs. Eckstein—along with an accompanying cast of, 
among others, miners, doctors, police agents, a land surveyor called 
Nandi, a living statue, and an omnipresent black cat. 
I’ve described this opening sequence in such great detail because 
it includes many of the stylistic features that I’ll discuss in this paper: 
the imitation of filmic conventions (the moving hands on the clock 
indicating the accelerated passage of time); the use of visual cues to 
create meaning (we know Soho is reading the letter because it moves 
slightly in his hand); the creation of continuity between shots (the 
bird flying from left to right, linking two sequential drawings, suggests 
that these scenes are temporally and geographically adjacent); the 
mixing of realistic and impossible effects (the outsize cat patrolling a 
suburban wall and producing the word “Stereoscope” behind it). In 
my attempt to address the question of why Kentridge, in this particular 
section of his substantial body of work (which includes everything from 
constructing large mechanically-operated music instruments to direct-
ing and co-designing the Metropolitan Opera’s 2010 production of 
Shostakovich’s The Nose), chooses to engage with animation, I examine 
how he uses both the technological apparatus and techniques of this 
medium, and what they allow him to do. In this brief introduction I 
begin to suggest some answers, but a fuller explanation will require 
me to delve back into the history of the medium itself.
Rosalind Krauss, in her article “‘The Rock’: William Kentridge’s 
Drawings for Projection” (originally published in 2000), has written very 
insightfully on Kentridge’s technique of “stone-age film-making.” To 
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Krauss, “the medium is the memory” (19), and thus, in order to study 
what she calls, in the Introduction to her 2010 book, “Kentridge’s 
exploitation of cinematic animation” (xiv), she also investigates the 
historical development of animation. She argues that Kentridge is 
“building a new medium on the technical support of a widespread and 
mostly mass-cultural cinematic practice, welcoming its condition as a 
popular rather than a high art” (66). Regressing through time and 
technical complexity, Krauss discusses early Disney cartoons, flip-books 
or flicker-books, and the thaumatrope as the popular precursors of 
Kentridge’s “stone-age animation,” coming to the conclusion that, in 
some ways, Kentridge’s work is even “more primitive” than these forms 
(71). Krauss thus sets the stage for a productive comparison between 
Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection and early Disney animated short 
films, but she soon categorizes these earlier animations as “weight-
less” (68), henceforth using them purely as a foil for determining 
where the weight of Kentridge’s works stems from. I believe, however, 
it is worth taking the time to examine in greater detail the aspects 
that Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection have in common with early 
black-and-white Disney cartoons. This allows me to pinpoint exactly 
how both the technology and the formal conventions of early Disney 
animations are redeployed in Kentridge’s work. 
At this juncture, I find it particularly productive to turn to Walter 
Benjamin, who, as part of his work on mass culture, wrote briefly but 
insightfully on Mickey Mouse, specifically the relationship between the 
technological apparatus of film and the content and conventions of 
these early cel animations. Kentridge’s demonstrated interest in the 
intersection between art, violence and technology is also the intersec-
tion at which Benjamin situates Mickey Mouse. 
In his “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproduc-
ibility,”2 written in 1935, Benjamin implicitly engages with the question 
of what separates certain kinds of mass entertainment, the apotheosis 
of which, to him, is Mickey Mouse, from Nazi spectacle, which is 
designed to offer the masses the appearance of change without hav-
ing to actualize it. To him, the early black-and-white Mickey Mouse 
cartoons embody the possibilities of a world in which technology is 
2Most English readers of Benjamin are familiar with the version of this essay published 
in Illuminations (1969), which is a translation of the 1955 German version edited by 
Theodor Adorno and Friedrich Podszus. The sections on Mickey Mouse were cut from 
this version. The version I’m using is a translation into English of the version Benjamin 
submitted to the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1936 and to which Adorno responds in 
his letter dated 18 March 1936. For more information, see Miriam Hansen, “Of Mice 
and Ducks: Benjamin and Adorno on Disney.”
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allowed to fulfill its full potential, instead of being diverted into war. 
Through these cartoons, Mickey Mouse can circle the world, teaching 
new ways of visual perception, a new filmic language, and even new 
wishes, as the embodiment of the collective dream. Kentridge takes 
up the question of what the medium of animation renders possible 
and engages emphatically with what Benjamin hints at: the dream-like 
logic governing the understanding of these early animated cartoons, 
a logic found in the roots of the medium itself, in which drawings 
are perceived as being intrinsically connected (part of the same mov-
ing image) merely because they are projected one after the other. 
The most enigmatic feature of Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection, the 
dramatic metamorphoses, is, I believe, a form of engaging with the 
dream-logic Benjamin intuits in early Mickey Mouse cartoons. I argue 
that Kentridge’s interest in animation is premised upon the following 
formal aspects of the medium: the relationship between animation 
and language; the way animation, as a technique, allows the staging 
and acceptance of the impossible; its potential for destruction and 
reconstruction; and the insight it offers one into the optical uncon-
scious: “what it is that we do when we see” (Kentridge and Breidbach 
110). Placing Disney’s early Mickey Mouse cartoons and Kentridge’s 
Drawings for Projection in a relationship that does not see one as simply 
the obsolete predecessor of the other allows for a reinterpretation of 
both bodies of work: Kentridge’s self-conscious engagement with the 
technology, artistic techniques and conventions of early animated film 
reveal how these features function in Disney and help illuminate Ben-
jamin’s rather obscure comments on the latter, whilst revisiting early 
Disney cartoons forces a closer encounter with Kentridge’s chosen 
medium. This encounter suggests that Kentridge finds the technical 
support of animation, and specifically “stone-age” animation, attractive 
because he is interested in exploring the set of rules that governs this 
medium. If Benjamin ascribes the role of collective dream-figure to 
Mickey Mouse, thereby conflating the Freudian concept of the asocial 
dream with the wholly social joke, Kentridge wants to take the joke 
seriously—that is, work within and experiment with the predictability 
that predicates the rules, forms of perception, and universal language 
trained by the medium of early Disney animation.
Krauss locates Kentridge’s interest in traditional animation in “the 
conventions cartoon animation developed, conventions that involve 
the serialized exploits of stock characters on the one hand and the 
possibility of physical metamorphosis on the other” (66). While these 
are key points at which to locate an overlap between the content of 
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Kentridge’s work and early Disney cartoons, I’d like to take a step back 
and look at the similarities between these works at the level of techni-
cal support and aesthetic technique, which are implied but somewhat 
taken for granted by Krauss. On the most basic technological level, 
both Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection and early cel animation work 
by combining drawings, cameras and music (contemporary computer-
generated imagery, in contrast, cuts out both drawings and cameras). 
In both cases, sound is added to the films when they are at the editing 
stage, which, conveniently, allows me to side-step the question of sound 
in this paper. I will instead be focusing exclusively on implications 
arising from the fact that, fundamentally, both early cel animation 
and Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection rely upon the bringing to life, 
through the illusion of movement created by the rapid succession of 
images projected at 24 frames per second on a screen, of hand-drawn 
two-dimensional lines on a page. 
Animated films differ from conventional photographic films in 
that they start from stationary drawings that are converted into mov-
ing pictures—conventional film involves the filming of movement, 
which is converted into a series of stationary photographs, which are 
then reconverted into movement by playing them at a certain speed. 
Animated films thus produce a remnant or remainder in the form of 
the drawings that were used, whereas in traditional film, the individual 
photographs or shots form part of the finished film roll. In Kentridge’s 
case, these drawings or remnants become artworks in their own right: 
since he makes alterations on each drawing, the final version of the 
drawing contains the traces of each change that has been made to it. 
These drawings can then be displayed alongside the films as a kind of 
frozen version of the film itself, from which one can reconstruct the 
changes made during a particular sequence (although not the order 
in which they were made). In the case of traditional cel animation, 
a much larger number of drawings are produced as waste products 
of the process. Looking more closely at the early Disney cartoons, 
however, makes it clear that they are not as wasteful as they could 
be: here, cel animation works by layering sheets of transparent cel-
lulose nitrate (hence the name) over static backgrounds, or a series 
of background images that loop (so that, if Minnie is running along 
a riverbank, she passes the same sequence of trees repeatedly). The 
images on the cellulose nitrate sheets, too, can be recycled in the case 
of repeated actions: Mickey turning a steamboat wheel backwards and 
forwards while whistling, for example. Even though early cel animation 
doesn’t draw attention to its recycling in the same way Kentridge does, 
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it is clear that the technical affinities between the two techniques are 
perhaps just as significant as the differences between them.
A closer look at the first black-and-white Mickey Mouse films is 
perhaps surprising, as these cartoons display a considerably more 
innovative relationship between contemporary technology and stylistic 
animation techniques than a passing knowledge of the later Mickey 
Mouse canon would suggest. The decisive change came, I suspect, with 
the departure in 1929 of Ub Iwerks, the animator of the very early 
Mickey Mouse cartoons. After that, the cartoons became increasingly 
formulaic and standardized. Looking at the opening scenes of the 1929 
short animated film, “The Karnival Kid,” however, demonstrates the 
magic of the early Mickey Mouse: As the title fades, the camera zooms 
out to reveal that what had seemed simply to be a black background 
to the title is actually the surface of a black balloon, which, along 
with three of its fellows, tied to her tail, are the only things keeping 
an upside-down smiling cow in the air. Behind her, you can see the 
hustle and bustle of the fairground: the crowd gathered outside the 
tent marked “Minnie the Shimmy Dancer”; the miniature planes of 
one of the rides circling around a pole; the rollercoaster, drawn in such 
detail that you can even see one small rider fall off. Entertainment 
that seems to be as light and airy as the balloons holding the laugh-
ing cow in the air is, however, also extraordinary, because of course, 
it isn’t the camera zooming out to present you with the whole frame: 
it’s a series of drawings, starting with a black screen and ending with a 
drawing featuring the entire, intricate world of the fairground. When 
you look closely, you notice that as the rollercoaster repeats its loop 
over and over again, the little figure in the distant background falls 
off at the same place every time: the background animation is being 
looped, creating an illusion of continuous movement and change. The 
techniques of conventional film are both imitated and exceeded using 
drawings, so that the animator can create the quasi-realistic impres-
sion that the cow is moving away from a camera being held in a fixed 
position, thereby gradually revealing what was initially hidden behind 
her, while at the same time showing the impossible: a cow being held 
up by four helium balloons. 
Mickey Mouse plays a pivotal role in the second version of Benjamin’s 
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” 
as the technologically mediated “figure of the collective dream” (38). 
In this essay Benjamin discusses the two faces of technology: through-
out, he is optimistic about its liberating potential for the masses, 
but in his epilogue, he also warns: “If the natural use of productive 
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forces is impeded by the property system, then the increase in tech-
nological means, in speed, in sources of energy will press toward an 
unnatural use. This is found in war” (42). Benjamin here thus makes 
the argument that the full potential of technology can only be real-
ized in a world where existing capitalist property relations have been 
overturned, since the current system will deprive it of the resources 
it needs to satisfy its ever-increasing appetites. Technology emerges 
almost as an independent force: “Imperialist war is an uprising on the 
part of technology, which demands repayment in ‘human material’ 
for the natural material society has denied it” (42). In this epilogue 
Benjamin explicitly addresses the threat of Fascism, and specifically 
the mass spectacles the National Socialists had started exploiting in 
Germany to generate mass support. War is the ultimate spectacle: 
“[Humankind’s] self-alienation has reached the point where it can 
experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure” (42). 
Mickey Mouse is seen as precariously tip-toeing the line between the 
potentially liberating or repressive fates of mass entertainment in an 
age of increased technologization: in an annotation, Benjamin writes 
of the Mickey Mouse cartoons filmed in color that “[t]heir gloomy and 
sinister fire-magic [Feuerzauber], made technically possible by color-film 
… shows how easily fascism takes over ‘revolutionary’ innovations in 
this field too” (51, endnote). These cartoons, through their reliance 
on the ‘fire-magic’ of color, more closely approximate the hypnotic, 
spectacular nature of Nazi rallies, for reasons I’ll discuss below. Ben-
jamin perceives a close relationship between the use of technology 
in war and in mass art, where the latter foreshadows the dangers of 
the former, but also offers an alternative outcome. 
The epilogue I just discussed thus offers us clues for interpreting 
an earlier passage on Mickey Mouse within the same essay: 
If one considers the dangerous tensions which technology and its con-
sequences have engendered in the masses at large—tendencies which at 
critical stages take on a psychotic character—one also has to recognize 
that this same technologization (Technisierung) has created the possibility 
of psychic immunization against such mass psychoses. It does so by means 
of certain films in which the forced development of sadistic fantasies or 
masochistic delusions can prevent their natural and dangerous maturation 
in the masses. Collective laughter is one such preemptive and healing 
outbreak of mass psychosis. The countless grotesque events consumed in 
films are a graphic indication of the dangers threatening mankind from 
the repressions implicit in civilization. American slapstick comedies and 
Disney films trigger a therapeutic release of unconscious energies. (38)
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We have already seen how technology can become threatening, in 
Benjamin’s opinion, if its natural development is checked by capitalist 
relations of property. Films, and specifically films which showcase the 
absurd, rehearse this danger, the danger of war. Burkhardt Lindner, 
who stresses the historical specificity of Benjamin’s Artwork essay in 
his essay on “Mickey Mouse and Charlie Chaplin,” writes that the 
shock-moments in Disney cartoons “refer through both medium and 
theme to the most modern technology. Traffic, airplanes, telephones, 
childhood and technology, catastrophes and frights find their way 
in here. The new world, as comically insular as it might seem, exists 
in the context of the realities of technologization, the masses of the 
metropolis, and world war” (“Mickey Mouse and Charlie Chaplin” 
153–154).3 Thus, at the level of content, these films work by rendering 
visible the dangers of technology through rendering them laughable. 
Relief, a “therapeutic release of unconscious energies” in Benjamin’s 
argument, occurs through laughter: laughter at another’s pain and 
punishment at the hands of technology that is rehearsed without 
having to be realized. Modern technology is thus bereft of its ability 
to inspire fear and tension, domesticated and internalized, like an 
immunization, in its comic, apparently harmless guise.
At the same time, though, we can see why this practice of defusing 
technology through humor would lend itself to Fascism if we stop at 
this definition of “psychic immunization [psychische Impfung].” This 
would be closer to a Fascist spectacle, in which the appearance of 
change and the illusion of self-expression allow leaders to avoid imple-
menting real change: “The masses have a right to changed property 
relations; fascism seeks to give them expression in keeping these rela-
tions unchanged” (Benjamin 41). If Disney cartoons and American 
slapstick provided merely the appearance of a peaceful resolution or 
incorporation of technology, this would not satisfy Benjamin’s vision 
of technology as a kind of independent organism with accelerating 
needs to be satisfied. For Lindner, the key term is also immunization, 
which he reads as turning the cinema into a kind of “isolation ward 
[Infektionsanhalt], in which the masses are estranged from their leaders 
as they follow outsiders with a totally different star-quality, unusable for 
totalitarianism, such as Chaplin or Mickey Mouse. These appear as the 
saboteurs of the burgeoning culture industry, as laughter therapists 
against Fascistic or Stalinistic collective psychoses” (“Mickey Mouse 
and Charlie Chaplin” 155). While I find Lindner’s insistence on the 
3I’ve used my own translation for both of Lindner’s essays, as no English translation 
had been published at the time of writing.
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historical specificity of the Artwork essay very helpful, I also find 
this reading of “psychic immunization” a bit too restrictive. I’m not 
sure that the collective psychoses Benjamin refers to can be limited 
to those of Stalinism and Fascism, or the desire for a Führer-figure. 
I also doubt if this explanation accounts for the fact that Benjamin 
sees the later, color Mickey Mouse cartoons as being appropriable 
by Fascism, in contrast to the early black-and-white ones, as most of 
the aspects Lindner describes would apply equally to both. Fascism is 
one possible reaction to the increased technologization of society, a 
reaction that, in Benjamin’s reading, attempts to absorb technology 
into war. However, the “dangerous tensions” produced by technology 
would have arisen irrespective of Fascism, and in fact provide the 
conditions of possibility for Fascism to take hold. Therefore, we have 
to look elsewhere for the mass psychoses produced by technology, 
psychoses which are replicated in small in Disney cartoons.
To get at this question of psychoses, one has to turn to what Ben-
jamin says specifically about Mickey Mouse, a few lines earlier in the 
Artwork essay:
Moreover, these two types of unconscious [the optical unconscious and the 
instinctual unconscious] are intimately linked. For in most cases the diverse 
aspects of reality captured by the film camera lie outside only the normal 
spectrum of sense impressions. Many of the deformations and stereotypes, 
transformations and catastrophes which can assail the optical world in films 
afflict the actual world in psychoses, hallucinations, and dreams. Thanks to 
the camera, therefore, the individual perceptions of the psychotic or the 
dreamer can be appropriated by collective perception. The ancient truth 
expressed by Heraclitus, that those who are awake have a world in com-
mon while each sleeper has a world of his own, has been invalidated by 
film—and less by depicting the dream world itself than by creating figures 
of the collective dream, such as the globe-encircling Mickey Mouse. (37–38)
These sentences help to clarify a number of points about the nature 
of the mass psychoses Benjamin posits, but also raise more questions. 
Firstly, at the most basic level, the technological apparatus of film allows 
for what had previously been purely individual experiences (dreams, 
hallucinations, psychoses) to be undergone as group experiences, 
through techniques such as the close-up and slow motion play. These 
techniques take the viewer outside the normal visual perspective, and 
thus reveal the world as unfamiliar—an experience that is liberating 
but also potentially frightening, as the reference to psychoses suggests. 
This revelatory feature of technology means that going to the cinema 
is akin to a kind of mass visual hallucination. Two things are interesting 
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here: First, Benjamin’s conflation of a psychically healthy phenom-
enon, that of dreaming, with psychoses and hallucinations. Second, 
the fact that there seem to be two different kinds of psychoses at work 
in this essay: one that produces visual hallucinations (seeing things) 
and the mass psychoses inspired by the increased technologization of 
society. I’ll return to Benjamin’s conception of the collective dream 
shortly, but to stay with the question of psychoses for now, I would 
suggest that the simulation of the first kind of psychosis (watching a 
film as a kind of group hallucination) is what performs the role of the 
immunization in preventing the second, more dangerous kind. The 
increased technologization of the world, the accelerated tempo and 
more thorough penetration of the world by technical devices, means 
that human beings have to adjust to a world that is constantly trans-
forming. Eventually, in Benjamin’s opinion, this world will demand 
the overthrow of existing relations of property. These demands could 
exceed the ability of human beings to adjust to them. Certain films 
then provide the training that one needs in order to adjust to this 
new world, firstly by training the eye to perceive the world completely 
differently, but also by staging a world that has been thoroughly per-
meated by technology, a world in which technology is able to fulfill its 
potential. Thus, to return to an earlier point, these specific films are 
not putting on a spectacle of change without allowing real change, 
but are instead teaching new forms of perception. 
Animation plays a key role here. Animated films are a product of 
technology: whereas before, one or two people could share a brief 
moment of amusement at the antics of a character in a flip-book, now 
an entire audience, and audiences across the world, can laugh at the 
same joke, in the same way they can marvel at the same dream or 
hallucination. The particular suitability of cel animation for perform-
ing this work of immunization stems from two aspects, I would argue: 
Animation’s particular technical aptitude for illuminating the optical 
unconscious; and the dream-like logic governing the content of Disney 
cartoons, including, crucially, Disney’s visual depictions of verbal jokes, 
where words become incarnated as things. Animation illustrates the 
idea of the optical unconscious in the most basic way, of course, by 
demonstrating to us even more clearly than film does the fact that our 
eyes and brains process a series of static images, projected at a rate of 
24 frames per second, as movement. More than that, though, I think 
the early Disney cartoons also expose the extent to which some of 
the film techniques which Benjamin also discusses, such as zooming 
out, point-of-view camera angles, or pin-holing in, for example, have 
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already started training the human brain to read them in a certain 
way. We can see this in the example I gave above, where we interpret 
the opening scenes of “Karnival Kid” as showing the camera zoom-
ing out from the black balloon. Early Disney cartoons in particular 
(this is unfortunately yet another innovation that seems to have been 
written out of the Mickey Mouse scripts after 1930) imitate certain 
filmic techniques to fantastic effect in a way that makes us aware of 
these techniques whilst subtly making fun of them. They provide a 
meta-commentary to regular photographic films that, I believe, would 
have made them particularly attractive to Benjamin as the ultimate 
insight into the optical unconscious.
 Lindner, as part of his extensive body of work on Benjamin, has 
also written on Benjamin’s dream-work. In his 2009 “Essay on ‘Traum-
kitsch’: The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology,” Lindner takes 
the reader on a fascinating journey through Benjamin’s references to 
dreams throughout his career. In response to the section of the “Art-
work” essay I’ve been discussing, he concludes, I believe correctly: “But 
precisely the stress on grotesque comedy and on collective laughter, 
into which the collective dream dissipates, is to a certain extent also 
a trick. With it, the fundamental difference Freud sees between the 
psychic settings of the dream and the comical is bypassed” (“Essay on 
‘Traumkitsch’” 243). Why is this conflation of the collective dream 
and the collective joke so crucial to Benjamin’s understanding of the 
role that early Mickey Mouse cartoons played in the psyche of their 
audiences? 
To return to my earlier point, we’ve seen that Benjamin groups 
together dreams, hallucinations and psychoses through the concept 
of “psychic immunization,” which turns the negative phenomena of 
visual hallucinations and psychoses into positive forms of preventative 
medicine which allow one to circumvent infection by more dangerous 
forms of psychoses that could result from the increased technologiza-
tion of culture. Dreams, in the Freudian tradition, also serve a positive 
medicinal role in the psyche—they allow for necessary sleep to take 
place by processing the day’s events and frustrations in a positive 
way, and, through the dream-work, they also permit long-term heal-
ing as the patient can come to terms with the problems at the root 
of their psychoses. Even as Freud admits that dreams and jokes do 
share certain techniques—“condensation, displacement, and indirect 
representation” (165)—the fundamental difference between them 
lies in their social intelligibility. Jokes exist only to be shared, and a 
joke that isn’t understood by others is a failed joke, whereas dreams 
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are based on events, memories, and wishes that can become intelli-
gible only through the dream-work. “A dream is a completely asocial 
mental product; [… a] joke, on the other hand, is the most social of 
all the mental functions that aim at a yield of pleasure” (Freud 179). 
In order for Mickey Mouse to work as a collective dream-figure, this 
dream has to take on certain aspects of the joke-logic, as this collective 
dream has to elicit laughter from a large audience. At the same time, 
it is important to Benjamin that it retain certain formal features of 
the dream-logic, specifically the acceptance of arbitrary connections 
one finds in the dream, and also the role the dream plays as a kind 
of wish-fulfillment. If we have already seen films training viewers in 
a specific way of perceiving the world, then perhaps early Mickey 
Mouse cartoons train them in a specific kind of wish through the 
mass reception of these films.
Looking more closely at some sequences from early black-and-
white Disney films will help elucidate what I mean by the dream-logic 
that plays out in them. One feature that Freud sees as particular to 
dreams, since he limits his investigation to verbal jokes, is particu-
larly applicable to the visual nature of Disney cartoons: the way in 
which “dream-thoughts are given a pictorial character, and eventu-
ally a plastic situation is arrived at which is the core of the manifest 
‘dream-picture’” (162). Furthermore, dream-logic also relies on the 
fact that “the connecting paths which start out from words are in the 
unconscious treated in the same way as connections between things” 
(177). In Disney’s “Karnival Kid,” one sequence depends upon a play 
on the term “hot dog”: the hot dogs Mickey-the-vendor sells physically 
resemble dachshunds (“sausage dogs”), can bark, roll over, scratch 
themselves and bite, and run away when you try to eat them. Thus, 
the visual gag is dependant upon a linguistic convention that associ-
ates sausages with dogs. At one point, Mickey loses his cart—after a 
couple of seconds of frantic searching, he whistles, and the whole 
cart comes crawling out from under the roundabout, sniffling “nose” 
first. The characteristics of a dog, which were first transferred to the 
sausages through a somewhat logical association, have now become 
associated with the cart from which the sausages are sold. The rela-
tionship between words (sausages and dogs), which exists only in 
language, is transferred into a relationship between things (sausages 
that act like dogs, the sausage cart and dogs, etc.) in a compelling 
pictorial presentation.
As I mentioned above, the major difference between jokes and 
dreams is that the “condition of intelligibility” (Freud 179) serves 
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to constrain the former because of their essentially social nature. 
In dreams, however, as opposed to jokes, “[u]nder the pressure of 
censorship, any sort of connection is good enough to serve as a 
substitute by allusion, and displacement is allowed from any element 
to any other” (Freud 172). The logic that governs the intelligibility 
of dreams is thus different from that governing jokes, and this logic 
is one that accepts arbitrary connections. Thinking in terms of the 
medium of animation, the entire technological framework that it is 
built upon supports this kind of logic. Technically, traditional cel ani-
mation works by placing a series of discrete drawings in a sequence. 
The brain interprets them as forming part of the same sequence based 
entirely on their temporal and spatial proximity (they are screened 
one after the other, and each frame is next to the other in the film 
strip)—there is no essential connection between one drawing and the 
next. To return to our earlier scene from “Karnival Kid,” the sequence 
of images in which an entirely black screen changes into a fairground 
scene through the black oval progressively getting smaller in each 
drawing is interpreted by the brain, trained by watching other films, 
as showing a camera zooming out from a black balloon that then 
recedes into the fairground. Thus the arbitrary connections between 
two independent drawings—the fact that they follow each other and, 
in some cases though not all, are similar (if there is a change of scene, 
the two drawings could be radically different, and yet we still believe 
them to be part of the same story)—are interpreted as essential con-
nections in the narrative reconstruction of the cartoon. Returning to 
the idea of the two layers of an early cel animation, one could even 
reuse a sequence of top, transparent layers (showing Mickey running, 
or dancing, for example) over a different background in a different 
cartoon, and it would then become part of a different story altogether 
(e.g. Mickey is running away from a monster, or Mickey is running to 
catch the cat who kidnapped Minnie). 
To take this argument even further, the medium (both through its 
technical underpinnings and the filmic techniques exploited by the 
animators) then allows for an acceptance of arbitrary connections 
within the contents of the cartoons. For example, as soon as one 
becomes comfortable with this extended metaphor from the above 
example (sausage = dog), Disney’s animators pull the rug out from 
under you—the hot dog which ran away rather than allowing itself 
to be eaten is caught, its pants pulled down and its bottom spanked. 
Suddenly we are in a different joke where the sausages are at the 
same time small children, not entirely sure how we ended up here. To 
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return to Freud’s description of the dream, it is exactly the connection 
between elements that becomes hard to discern. 
For Benjamin, it is crucial that Mickey Mouse is not just the figure of 
the collective joke, but the collective dream as well. As I have argued, 
looking at the dream-logic of early Disney cartoons themselves corrobo-
rates this observation. If the most important difference in composition 
between dreams and jokes relies on their social intelligibility or lack 
thereof, this is related to their function. As Freud states, “jokes and 
dreams have grown up in quite different regions of mental life and 
must be allotted to points in the psychological system far remote from 
each other. A dream still remains a wish, even though one that has 
been made unrecognizable; a joke is developed play [ein entwickeltes 
Spiel]” (179). Benjamin aligns Mickey Mouse with the dream/wish 
because this, in turn, means that Mickey Mouse cartoons act as a kind 
of wish-fulfillment, but the fulfillment of a wish that, I would argue, 
the cartoons themselves create. Earlier in the essay, Benjamin makes 
the temporally complicated argument that the very fact that a film 
receives a mass reception in a cinema in a way predetermines what 
that reception will be: 
The technological reproducibility of the artwork changes the relation 
of the masses to art. The extremely backward attitude towards a Picasso 
painting changes into a highly progressive reaction to a Chaplin film. […] 
The conventional is uncritically enjoyed, while the truly new is criticized 
with aversion. Not so in the cinema. The decisive reason for this is that 
nowhere more than in the cinema are the reactions of individuals, which 
together make up the massive reaction of the audience, determined by the 
imminent concentration of reactions into a mass. (36)
The experience of art thus changes fundamentally with the advent 
of the technological reproducibility of the artwork: the fact that the 
individual opinion will immediately become part of the group opinion 
influences the individual opinion itself, resulting in a mass opinion 
that is more likely to be progressive than reactionary. This is why it 
is so important to Benjamin that Mickey Mouse becomes the figure 
of a collective dream, not simply a dream-like figure: the collective 
aspect of the reception of Mickey Mouse thus means that the reac-
tion of its audience will be predetermined to a certain extent—this is 
where the training comes in. If, as I have argued earlier, these black-
and-white Mickey Mouse films present the audience with a world in 
which the varied needs of technology are satisfied, and not held back 
or thwarted in such a way as to lead to war, the collective dream allows 
this to be read by the audience as the fulfillment of a wish. The wish 
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is that for a fully technologized society, which for Benjamin implies 
a society in which the existent capitalist relations of property have 
been overthrown.
The later Mickey Mouse films, starting with the departure of Iwerks in 
1929 but firmly cemented by the advent of the spectacle of Technicolor 
in 1935, lost this utopic dimension. I believe that what Benjamin is 
responding to in his critique of the later films is the fact that they rely 
less and less upon the kind of dream-like logic I described earlier, and 
become increasingly formulaic and non-experimental. No longer do 
we have scenes that imitate camera angles or other cinematic tricks 
(such as point-of-view shots, or zooming in and out), Mickey Mouse 
and the other characters take on increasingly fixed shapes (no more 
crazy distortions of arms, legs, noses, etc), and the humor becomes 
increasingly predictable. These cartoons instead depend upon the “fire-
magic” of color to distract viewers, unaccustomed to this new wonder 
of technology, from their lack of innovation and repetitive jokes. This 
is an excellent example of how the pretense of an increased utilization 
of technology can disguise the fact that technology is instead being 
harnessed and tamed, something that Benjamin sees occurring in 
Nazi mass spectacles. The fact that these cartoons can now be filmed 
and shown in color does not fundamentally alter what I have argued 
to be the crucial technical aspect of animation—the fact that a series 
of stationary drawings are brought to life by a camera. However, the 
relationship between the technical support and the contents (both 
thematic and stylistic) of the cartoons has changed—no longer do 
animators draw attention to the liberating possibilities of this specific 
technology, but rather, they attempt to hide its hallucinatory aspects, 
create films that are closer to what Benjamin refers to as “the nor-
mal spectrum of sense impressions” (37). As Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno would write in 1947, “Donald Duck in the cartoons 
[like] the unfortunate victim in real life receive[s his beating] so that 
the spectators can accustom themselves to theirs” (110, translation 
modified). Technology in these films thus does not provide immu-
nization against the mass psychoses it generates, but simply a mirror 
that reflects them as normal and even necessary. The characters lose 
their ability to function as figures of a collective dream or wish, and 
become, instead, part of the pageant that can be exploited (by Fas-
cism, for Benjamin, or capitalism, for Horkheimer and Adorno) to 
retard the natural development of technology.
Krauss, like Horkheimer and Adorno, is skeptical of the revolution-
ary anti-capitalist potential of Mickey Mouse cartoons. She writes: 
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Disney’s ‘plasmaticness’ may thus not be a twentieth-century version of the 
phenomenon of fire or the primitive idea of animism [as Sergei Eisenstein 
argues], but, instead, an analogue of the principle of universal equivalence 
that reigns at the heart of capital … The abstract condition of the general 
equivalent, the fluidity of its circulation and exchange, the sense of its end-
lessly transformative power, make the cartoon figure and money particularly 
apt mirrors of one another. (68)
This “endlessly transformative power” is often attributed to Disney 
cartoons. In fact, Disney’s early cartoon characters very rarely, if 
ever, turn into something else completely. It is not that “cars turn 
into dangerous monsters, pigs into accordions, fish into tigers, and 
octopuses into elephants” (47) as Miriam Hansen, to whose other-
wise excellent essay “Of Mice and Ducks: Benjamin and Adorno on 
Disney” I am heavily indebted, blithely states. Rather, cars grow into 
dangerous monsters that are still cars, pigs are played like accordions, 
tiger-fish roar like tigers, and a family of octopuses will follow each 
other, marching on four tentacles, with a fifth resembling a trunk 
and the sixth a tail, resembling and behaving like elephants while 
at the same time clearly remaining octopuses (“Steamboat Willie”; 
“Merbabies”). Krauss’s argument that early Mickey Mouse cartoons 
are “weightless” in comparison to the weight Kentridge’s bear relies 
heavily on the assumption that in early Disney cartoons “anything 
can turn into anything else”: she argues that in Kentridge’s work, 
as opposed to Disney’s, there is “another condition that … operates 
against the principle of anything changing into anything else, or at 
least works to dilate the time within which the change occurs and 
to underscore the impossibility of predicting what form it will take” 
(69). This implicit criticism of Disney cartoons states that in Disney 
cartoons, the embodiment of the “principle of equivalence at the 
heart of capital,” anything can change into anything else—however, 
this change also has to be somehow predictable. I’ve already discussed 
how, in the original Disney films, things do not actually change into 
other things. It is also hard to argue that these joke-sequences are 
always predictable, as I have demonstrated with the example of the 
hot dogs that act like dogs at first, but later like small children. 
I would argue that rather than looking at the unpredictability of 
Kentridge’s transformations or the “dilation of time” involved in 
them as being in some way a critique of early cel animation, Mickey 
Mouse cartoons in particular, one should focus on the way Kentridge 
engages with the features of animated films I have, through Benjamin, 
elucidated above. Kentridge, I believe, while not attempting to create 
1162 NieNke Boer
a kind of “collective dream” through his work, is interested in taking 
up the issues raised by thinking about Mickey Mouse as the figure of 
a collective dream—that is, the extent to which film, and particularly 
animated film, can train the viewer in new ways of perceiving the 
world visually, understanding visual cues to meaning, and accept-
ing arbitrary connections between scenes as essential. All of these 
aspects are already present in the cold open to Stereoscope with which 
I started this article, but approaching them through Mickey Mouse, 
and particularly Benjamin’s writing on Mickey Mouse, helps formulate 
exactly how they play out in the medium of animation, which in turn 
suggests what Kentridge gains by entering his work into this tradition. 
In a recent televised interview, Kentridge states: “The absurd [is] 
not... a peripheral mistake at the edge of society, but a central point 
of construction. The absurd, for me, is a species of realism rather than 
a species of joke or fun. This is what allows me to take the joke of The 
Nose seriously” (William Kentridge: Anything is Possible). Kentridge in 
this case is referring specifically to his work on Shostakovitch’s opera, 
The Nose, a version of which he directed at the Metropolitan Opera in 
March 2010. However, I suspect that this sentiment of taking a joke 
seriously is what guides much of his work, including the Drawings for 
Projection. As Kentridge says in the opening scene of this interview, his 
art stems from “the seriousness of play.” This formulation—the serious-
ness of play—reminds us of Freud’s distinction between the joke and 
the dream cited earlier: “A dream still remains a wish, even though 
one that has been made unrecognizable; a joke is developed play.” If 
it was surprising to find Benjamin insisting upon the dream-function 
of Mickey Mouse cartoons when they seem, ostensibly, to fall so firmly 
within the category of jokes, it is perhaps even more surprising to find 
that Kentridge’s description of his own work, work which is certainly 
more eerie than funny and filled with moments of indecipherability, 
aligns it closely with Freud’s description of the key characteristic of 
jokes. In the same way that categorizing Mickey Mouse as a collec-
tive dream-figure was highly productive for Benjamin, though, it is 
important, in order to understand Kentridge’s intentions, to look at 
what he means by taking a joke seriously. Elsewhere, he says of the 
usefulness of play that “through this activity of play, of giving yourself 
over to play and taking seriously the arbitrary rules of that particular 
form, when you play, a sense and a meaning can emerge” (Kentridge 
and Breidbach 65). Jokes, unlike dreams, tend to fall into certain pat-
terns (which is why Freud can neatly categorize jokes according to 
how different types function), and be governed by certain rules. The 
most important of these rules would be the “condition of intelligibil-
1163M L N
ity” Freud talks about, but there are also others. Jokes are enjoyable, 
to a certain extent, because they are predicable. The listener knows 
that a punch line will conclude the recitation. It is this characteristic 
of jokes, rather than their humor or their social function, which 
interests Kentridge. Throughout his work, I believe, he is interested 
in working with, but thereby also exposing, the unwritten rules which 
guide perception. 
Thus Kentridge engages with the way in which traditional animated 
cartoons are, to a certain extent, shaped by our linguistic usage—for 
example, the extended play on the term “hot dog” that I elaborated 
upon above. Kentridge locates a model for his own way of construct-
ing a film in Cockney rhyming slang, another form of play governed 
by strict rules and structures. Usually, slang words for an object are 
connected through rhyme: apples and pears for stairs, plates of meat 
for feet. “Then what happens within Cockney rhyming slang is that 
you only use the first word… You don’t say ‘I’m going up the apples 
and pears’ for the stairs, you say, ‘I’m going up the apples.’ The key 
point of connection was there initially, but then it disappears” (Ken-
tridge and Breidbach 87). Kentridge uses this analogy to discuss his 
technique, how he gets from an original idea to a final product that 
may contain no resemblance to the original thought, but it is also use-
ful in discussing his visual metamorphoses. “You have the two words 
and they have a relationship which makes sense or a story. Then you 
have only one word and a gap in the story” (Kentridge and Breidbach 
88). Unless you know the convention, the second word would mean 
nothing to you. Kentridge’s visual metamorphoses seem to operate 
like a rhyming slang where the conventional connections have been 
lost. If in metaphor, according to Breidbach, “two terms hold an idea 
in themselves and between themselves, an image, a space, which is 
not spoken but implied or thought through them” (Kentridge and 
Breidbach 88), then in Kentridge’s work, this third term is obscure. 
To elucidate this idea, let’s look more closely at one of Kentridge’s 
transformations, a particularly apt one as it features one of Kentridge’s 
favorite animated animals, the cat, whom we have already met in the 
first paragraph of this essay. Throughout Stereoscope, the cat will effort-
lessly move between spaces, undeterred by high walls, socioeconomic 
divides, or even the laws of physics. In a later shot, we see the cat walk 
past another wall, this one more suggestive of the inner city: topped 
with barbed wire, with two illegible signs on posts bordering it, the 
sequence of shots and soundtrack (you can hear the murmur of pro-
testers) suggests that this is close to the protest site pictured towards 
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the end of the film. It also, at various points, moves in and out of 
what looks like the security booth separating the gated community 
or business from the rest of the city. The cat features in three main 
ways in this film: as Soho’s loyal companion (shades of a James Bond 
villain stroking his white Persian cat) who can move between social 
spheres; as a blue subterranean figure who forms part of the network 
of communication lines which also span the different parts of the city; 
and, finally, as the bomb which blows up the various spaces, from the 
protestors to Soho’s interior realm. In all of these incarnations, the cat 
possesses a freedom of movement Soho seems both to envy and fear, 
as he listens with his ears pressed against the wall of his small room 
to the gathering crowd outside. The cat thus plays a vital thematic 
role in this film, which is concerned with the segregation of spaces: 
both in the way Soho’s room will be split (and split again), giving rise 
to the title Stereoscope, and in the division of the city, from the gated 
community with its high walls to the apartment complexes where each 
family or individual occupies his/her own ‘box’ to the city streets that 
fill with rioters who do not have the luxury of private space, who have 
even the space of their own bodies violated by the police.
In one of the film’s most enigmatic moments, the frame shows a 
screen split in two, each half showing an initially identical scene, in the 
same way Soho’s space is doubled earlier. In each half, we see the cat, 
framed by what looks like it could be a storage room or, more sinisterly, 
an interrogation chamber (the items on the floor are indistinct, but 
from the ceiling hangs what could be a noose). The cat bends over to 
lick itself, and in a second is transformed. In this sequence, I suspect, 
Kentridge makes changes to the drawing between almost each frame, 
since the transition is so quick and smooth—there is just one small 
pause halfway through, when the cat-creature is a square box for a 
couple of frames. Each cat turns into a different piece of mechanical 
equipment, and the room immediately looks more like a storeroom 
or outhouse built to house bulky mechanical items. Our interpreta-
tion of the setting is guided by the visual clues provided within the 
frame, but Kentridge here implicitly suggests that this perception is 
open to manipulation. The other question is about the relationship 
between the cat and the machines: is there some essential connection, 
some third term they share in common, that renders this readable 
as a metaphor? Kentridge’s work is challenging because, I believe, it 
conveys the impression that there is—that, if only you could work your 
way back to the original bit of rhyming slang, this story would make 
complete sense. At the same time, this third term, the rhyming word, 
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is irrevocably lost from the outset: there is no convention that could 
provide the clue, or rather, any number of words could rhyme with 
“pears.” Kentridge’s metamorphoses thus push the essential technical 
condition of animated films, the fact that different drawings are seen as 
connected purely because they appear one after the other, to its limit. 
Of course, Kentridge’s sequences are physically connected because the 
changes are made to the same drawing—thus, the mechanical pieces of 
equipment still bear the traces of the cat, since both figures occupied 
the same space on the single drawing used. At the same time, however, 
the contents of these metamorphoses strain at the human instinct 
to make sense of the happenings on-screen—as much as one tries 
to imagine a connection, there doesn’t seem to be one. This makes 
the viewer aware of the dream-like logic governing the reception of 
animated cartoons, causing one to reflect back upon the transitions 
one did accept as a matter of convention: for example, the fact that 
a similar-looking bird crosses two separate scenes in the cold open 
leads one to assume that these scenes are geographically proximate. 
Kentridge is adept at using both techniques and conventions culled 
from films in his work—for example, eye-line matching, tracking shots, 
zooming in and out, close-ups, and other forms of continuity editing. 
As we saw with the Disney films, animated cartoons can provide a 
kind of meta-commentary on film conventions. Benjamin’s writing on 
Disney suggests that film in general can train the way visual images 
are perceived—in effect, teach a different language that becomes 
universally comprehensible through the spread of films like Disney’s 
Mickey Mouse animated cartoons. For example, the very first shot in 
Stereoscope shows the moving dials on a clock in an industrial control 
room. We all, immediately, understand that this indicates that time 
is passing. This is a sign universally understood wherever film cul-
ture has established itself. The idea of Mickey Mouse as a figure of 
the collective dream, if one follows my reasoning that this ‘dream’ 
produces a wish within its audience that it then presents itself as ful-
filling, suggests that films do more than just train visual perception, 
but also, to a certain extent, are capable of training the unconscious 
as well. Thus, even if it initially seems as if much of Disney’s humor 
is predicated upon linguistic usage and conventions that would be 
specific to the language in which they were created, English, this is 
not necessarily the case. In the first place, as director and film theo-
rist Sergei Eisenstein, who wrote astutely on Mickey Mouse in 1941, 
points out, there is something already universal about the literaliza-
tion of metaphor that one sees in Disney. Many of Disney’s gags work 
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by exposing the illogical logic of language, or rather, by reminding 
you of the pre-logical roots of language. The appeal of animation 
stems, in Eisenstein’s argument, from animism, a return to an earlier 
“stage of sensuous thought”: “From an unexpected shock—a man 
bumps into a chair in the dark—you regress to the stage of sensuous 
thought: you curse the chair as though it were a living being” (127). 
This reversion takes you back to the stage in which “primitive man 
endows inanimate nature…with life” (Eisenstein 128). This stage of 
sensuous thought perhaps underpins most languages’ use of figural 
language, so that the universal appeal of Mickey Mouse cartoons 
transcends immediate understanding of English-specific metaphors. 
Secondly, these early Mickey Mouse films are designed to speak to 
the then-growing population of world citizens fluent in the language 
of film. Mickey Mouse, as the figure of the collective dream, in fact 
teaches this universal language. I believe that Benjamin is referring to 
this characteristic of being universally comprehensible when he calls 
Mickey Mouse “globe-encircling [erdumkreisend]” (38). Kentridge is 
working in a period when familiarity with this language can generally 
be assumed. The moments of incomprehensibility in his films when 
this language breaks down are thus particularly striking, drawing 
attention to the existence of this generally unreflectively accepted 
universal language. 
Kentridge self-consciously engages with another element of Benja-
min’s discussion of the violent potential of technology as embodied 
by film that is specific to animated film. As Kentridge states, in con-
ventional animation,
there is a sense of extraordinary violence that has no consequences. So a 
safe falls on someone’s head and they get squashed flat but they reconstitute 
themselves. They go through a meat chopping board and get chopped up 
by thousand knifes [sic] and in the next frame they put themselves back … 
In my films there are very few changes from things being violently destroyed 
and rising again as a transformation. (Kentridge and Breidbach 102)
His examples here make it clear that Kentridge is not thinking of the 
early Mickey Mouse cartoons, where this kind of violent destruction 
of the characters almost never occurs. As I explained above, their 
bodies are stretched and distorted, but never completely destroyed. 
In fact, it seems almost odd that Kentridge would insist on the vio-
lence of traditional animation, when in his own films, objects very 
frequently turn from one thing into another, and back again (for 
example, in the example described above, the cat(s) re-emerge in a 
later scene, appearing out of what seems to be a giant hole punch). 
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Speaking of the ease of turning a cat into a telephone in the anima-
tion studio, Kentridge states that “transformation, metamorphosis is 
of course the bread and butter of animation” (“Drawing Lesson 5”). 
Kentridge’s strategy for dealing with the violence he sees as inherent 
in the medium of animation, a violence that is already part of the 
technique of metamorphosis, is to insist on consequences. While the 
cat changes into a machine, or the hole punch into a cat, or the cat 
into a telephone, traces of the earlier form are still left in the imper-
fectly erased charcoal smudges. Thus, one’s attention is sparked at 
moments when Kentridge’s films do feature exactly that which he 
deplores in so-called “traditional animation”: the violent destruction 
and putting back together of objects.
A broken teacup plays a vital thematic role in Kentridge’s Weigh-
ing… and Wanting (1998), symbolizing the violent disruption of the 
relationship between the two main characters. Yet, towards the end 
of the film, the broken bits of the teacup come together before our 
eyes, and the lines where they are joined together are erased. The 
teacup in the final scenes of this film shows no traces of having been 
broken—not even smudged erased lines are visible. How are we to 
interpret this instance of Kentridge’s avoidance of ‘consequences,’ his 
own play with the ability to turn back time that the technical support 
of animated film allows? After all, quite frequently in his films he will 
have recourse to older film footage; that is, at the end of a film he 
will re-use a shot from the beginning of the film, so that a scene to 
which we have seen several changes made will once again be shown in 
its pristine, original form (for example, Tide Table (2003) opens and 
closes with an identical shot of a drawing of beach huts). Is Kentridge 
here side-stepping his own insistence on consequences? It is hard to 
say. In the case of the teacup, it seems to me as if Kentridge is deliber-
ately drawing attention to the artificiality of the reconstruction of the 
teacup, perhaps warning the viewer that reconciliation (inter-personal 
but also in the larger South African context) can sometimes paper 
over cracks apparently seamlessly, whilst leaving them intact. Here, 
the technology of animation allows for a visual demonstration of a 
thematic idea. In all the cases where Kentridge re-uses footage out 
of sequence (revisiting shots from the beginning of a film), the same 
structure may be in place—the viewer is called upon to view these shots 
with suspicion, exactly because they seem to erase the consequences 
of the oft-violent events that took place on-screen during the film.
The concept of taking a joke seriously lies at the foundation of 
what I have attempted to do in this paper. Engaging with Kentridge’s 
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technical support, “stone-age” animation, requires that we revisit Walt 
Disney’s early Mickey Mouse cartoons. Walter Benjamin provides the 
clues as to how to go about this endeavor by recasting Mickey Mouse 
as the figure of the collective dream. Ultimately, a minute examina-
tion of early black-and-white Disney cartoons alongside Benjamin’s 
analysis of them suggests that Kentridge may have chosen the medium 
of animation as one way of engaging in “developed play”: Benjamin 
and Disney suggest that the rules governing animation are particularly 
interesting in what they reveal about the way our visual perception, 
but also our unconscious, can be trained. By doing what he does best, 
taking the arbitrary rules of this form of play seriously, Kentridge is 
able to expand upon Benjamin’s observations on these rules through 
demonstrating their limits. This allows him to ask, indirectly, pen-
etrating and thought-provoking questions about the medium itself, 
questions which can also obliquely refer to larger issues of violence, 
reconciliation, and the processing of history. In the remark Krauss 
draws the title of her paper from, Kentridge describes Apartheid 
as a rock, saying that “you cannot face the rock head-on; the rock 
always wins” (quoted in Krauss 57). However, as any player of Rock-
Paper-Scissors knows, paper can beat rock by folding around it, an 
apt analogy for the strategy Kentridge uses to wrap his paper-drawn 
animations around social and political issues in South Africa without 
attempting to resolve them. 
New York University
WORKS CITED
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: 
Second Version.” Trans. Edmund Jephcott and Harry Zohn. The Work of Art in the 
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media. Ed. Michael W. 
Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2008. Print.
Eisenstein, Sergei M. “On Disney.” The Eisenstein Collection. Ed. Richard Taylor. London; 
New York; Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2006. Print.
Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Ed. James Strachey. Vol. VIII (1905). 
London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1960. Print.
Hansen, Miriam. “Of Mice and Ducks: Benjamin and Adorno on Disney.” The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 92.1 (Winter 1993): 27–61. Print.
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments. Ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002.
“Karnival Kid.” Dir. Ub Iwerks. Mickey Mouse in Black and White. Walt Disney Video, 
2002. DVD.
1169M L N
Kentridge, William. “Drawing Lesson 5: In Praise of Mistranslation.” Six Drawing Les-
sons. The Norton Lectures. Harvard University. Sanders Theater, Cambridge, MA. 
16 April 2012. Lecture.
———. “‘Fortuna’: Neither Programme nor Chance in the Making of Images.” William 
Kentridge. Ed. Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev. Brussels: Société des Expositions du Palais 
des Beaux Arts, 1998. Print.
———. Stereoscope. 1999. Ubuweb. Web. 7 March 2012. 
———. Tide Table. 2003. William Kentridge: Five Themes. Ed. Mark Rosenthal. San Fran-
cisco: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art/West Palm Beach: Norton Museum 
of Art/New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. DVD.
———. Weighing…and Wanting. 1997. YouTube. Web. 6 January 2011.
———. William Kentridge: Anything Is Possible. Dir. Charles Atlas. Art21. Screened Oct. 
21, 2010, PBS. Web. 25 November 2010.
Kentridge, William and Angela Breidbach. Thinking Aloud: Conversations with Angela 
Breidbach. Johannesburg: David Krut Publishing, 2006. Print.
Krauss, Rosalind E. Perpetual Inventory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. Print.
Lindner, Burkhardt. “Mickey Mouse und Charlie Chaplin. Benjamins Utopie der Mas-
senkunst,” Schrift Bilder Denken: Walter Benjamin und die Künste. Ed. Detlev Schöttker. 
Berlin/Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 2004. Print.
———. “Versuch über Traumkitsch. Die blaue Blume im Land der Technik.” Walter 
Benjamin und die romantische Moderne. Ed. Heinz Brüggemann and Günter Oesterle. 
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann GmbH, 2009. Print.
“Merbabies: A Walt Disney Silly Symphony.” Walt Disney Prod. Ltd., 1938. Youtube. 
Web. 7 March 2012.
“Steamboat Willie.” Dir. Ub Iwerks. Mickey Mouse in Black and White. Walt Disney Video, 
2002. DVD.
